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This article intends to describe and analyse the significance and the limits of judicial 
supervision in Italy. Observations and conclusions will be mainly based on semi-
structured interviews with prosecutors, police officers and lawyers conducted in Italy 
in 2006. It will be argued that prosecutors can effectively supervise cases that they 
prioritised even though they may leave the police wide discretion in the investigation 
of routine cases. In so doing, fresh perspectives in the debate around judicial 
supervision of police investigations will be explored. The question is of intrinsic 
interest for the analysis of the operation of continental criminal justice systems. Italian 
criminal procedure is a mixture of adversarial and inquisitorial legal principles and 
judicial supervision is firmly based on co-ordination between police and prosecutors 
(who direct the investigation). Moreover, the nature of judicial supervision has also 
been a subject of debate within the Anglo-American literature which has examined 
prosecutorial practice in inquisitorial criminal justice systems. Goldstein and Marcus 
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in 1977 and the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice in England and Wales 
(Runciman) in 1993 reached similar conclusions: judicial supervision is, in practice, 
ineffective. Other authors such as Langbein and Weinreb have suggested a different 
interpretation and remarked on prosecutors’ fundamental contribution, in inquisitorial 
criminal procedures, to the shaping of the case file. The analysis of prosecutorial 
practice in Italy can substantially contribute to this debate. And, more generally, it can 




This paper examines a central feature of Italian criminal procedure – the prosecutor’s 
power to direct criminal investigations.  It draws on the author’s empirical study 
conducted in Italy between April and October 2006.  Following some guidance from 
five consultants (2 prosecutors, 1 police officer and 2 lawyers), 49 semi-structured 
were conducted with prosecutors (27), police officers (11) and lawyers (11).  Whilst 
some interviews were conducted in the centre and the south of Italy, the study focused 
on practice in the north and  were conducted in 10 prosecution offices (lawyers and 
police officers working in the same area).1 Italian prosecutors are part of the judiciary 
and legally supervise and direct the police during investigations, though the police 
retain significant powers to shape investigation strategies. The central question is: 
                                                 
1
 The size of the prosecution offices was variable going from very small to very large. Size was 
determined according to the number of prosecutors working in the office and taking into account the 
area for which the prosecution office has jurisdiction. From now abbreviations will be used to indicate 
the interviewees. These are: CP (chief prosecutor), DCP (deputy chief prosecutor), AP (assistant 
prosecutor), APApl. (assistant prosecutor at the court of appeal), L (lawyer) and Pol.(police). 
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how effective is judicial supervision in Italy? The study reveals that judicial 
supervision is effective despite the fact that prosecutorial practices do not fully reflect 
the legal principles that inform the inquisitorial tradition (or, at least, Italian criminal 
procedure). Thus, in this context, effectiveness does not necessarily mean fulfilling 
the specific legal objectives set out in the Italian code of criminal procedure. Judicial 
supervision is effective to the extent that its mechanisms, in practice, allow 
prosecutors to regulate and influence the investigation. There are various means to 
achieve this objective and close supervision of police activities is one. There are, 
however, other solutions: prosecutors’ powers to take crucial decisions during 
investigations, their capacity to suggest investigation strategies and their interactions 
with the police can increase prosecutors’ chances of exercising control and influence. 
The topic is relevant because it is central to the analysis of the role of prosecutors in 
contemporary criminal justice systems. Failure to supervise the investigation 
effectively (where this power exists) may  open the door to extensive and uncontrolled 
police powers that, accordingly, can undermine both the rights of the defendant and of 
the victim. Italy is of interest for the analysis of continental inquisitorial systems 
because of the peculiar and problematic structure of Italian criminal procedure. This is 
a mixture of inquisitorial and adversarial principles in which prosecutors’ functions 
and institutional role during the investigation are not clearly set out. More generally, 
this paper tries to describe that, when certain conditions apply, an effective form of 
co-ordination between prosecutors and police is possible. After the analysis of the 
relevant academic literature, the legal context and prosecutors’ institutional role is 
examined and the law in action is put under the microscope. The official legal 
discourse depicts prosecutors as the pivot of the investigation, but what does directing 
the investigation mean in practice? This question is addressed by analyzing 
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prosecutors’ relations with their ‘assigned’ police officers and by describing and 
critically examining their power to direct investigations when a case has been 
prioritized and when prosecutors believe a case is unimportant. The central argument 
is that prosecutors can - and in Italy do - effectively supervise serious cases even if 
routine ones are left to the police. 
 
2. Judicial supervision: the story so far 
 
Judicial supervision is a concept which refers to the practice of prosecuting 
magistrates (prosecutors or examining judges) in determining how criminal 
investigations should be conducted and what charges should be filed.2 In particular, 
inquisitorial theory3 recognizes that judicial supervision is aimed at controlling the 
                                                 
2
 A. S. Goldstein and M. Marcus, ‘The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three “Inquisitorial” Systems: 
France, Italy, and Germany”, Vol. 87 The Yale Law Journal (1977) pp. 240-283, p. 247. This is a 
generalization. There are some exceptions. For example, in the Netherlands, the Rechter-Commissaris 
“does not draw conclusions or make decisions about guilt” and “most investigation is actually done by 
the police under overall prosecutor supervision”. However, The Rechter-Commisaris is still a judicial 
figure that must be institutionally impartial. See, S. Field, P. Alldridge and N. Jörg, ‘Prosecutors, 
Examining Judges, and Control of Police Investigations’, In P. Fennell P, C. Harding, N. Jörg and B. 
Swart, ed., Criminal Justice in Europe A Compartaive Study (New York, 1995) pp. 227-251, pp. 241-
242.  
3
 Judicial supervision is considered to be one of the distinctive characteristics of inquisitorial criminal 
procedure systems. Goldstein and Marcus (A. S. Goldstein and M. Marcus, loc. cit., p. 247) say that: 
“Inquisitorial theory recognises that the key to overall judicial supervision is control of the 
investigation of crime”. 
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investigation.4 The controller is a magistrate who, legally, has a quasi-judicial status 
and should impartially supervise the investigation. Inquisitorial methods of judicial 
supervision are of obvious interest to those from the inquisitorial tradition. But they 
have also prompted debate amongst commentators from the adversarial tradition.5 The 
dominant Anglo-American academic literature has emphasised both the structural (e. 
g. lack of resources to scrutinise every investigation in the same way) and cultural6 
reasons behind the ineffectiveness of judicial supervision within continental 
inquisitorial criminal procedure. Goldstein and Marcus analyzed the practice of 
judicial supervision in France, Italy and Germany. Their conclusion was quite 
straightforward: judicial supervision does not exist and is mythical.7 More recently, 
Hodgson highlighted that in France police are highly independent during the 
investigation and that prosecutors are functionally dependent on police. This means 
                                                 
4
 Ibid. See also J. Hodgson, ‘The police, the prosecutor and the juge d’instruction. Judicial Supervision 
in France, Theory and Practice’, Vol. 41(2) British Journal of Criminology (2001) pp. 342-361, p. 342. 
5
 Goldstein and Marcus discuss the problems related to prosecutorial discretion in America, and they 
argue that: “Responding to these concerns, commentators are turning their attention to the so-called 
inquisitorial systems of the Western European nations”. (A. S. Goldstein and M. Marcus, loc. cit., p. 
242). This article was written more than 30 years ago, but looking at different jurisdictions is still a 
useful exercise to capture the very nature of certain legal and practical problems.      
6
 As Lawrence Friedman says, legal culture refers “to ideas, values, expectations and attitudes towards 
law and legal institutions, which some public or some parts of the public holds”. See L. M. Friedman, 
‘The Concept of Legal Culture: A Reply’, in D. Nelken, ed., Comparing Legal Cultures (Dartmouth, 
1997) pp. 33-41, p. 34. ‘Internal’ legal culture is the legal culture of “those members of society who 
perform specialised legal tasks”. See L. M. Friedman, The Legal System: A Social Science Perspective 
(New York, 1975) p. 233. This will be the meaning of the expression legal culture for the purposes of 
this article. 
7
 A. S. Goldstein and M. Marcus, loc. cit., This research was also based on interviews with legal actors. 
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that in order to implement their functions, prosecutors are dependent on the 
information collected by police that conduct the investigation for which prosecutors 
are responsible for.8 This suggests that in France the underlying legal culture is one in 
which prosecutors accept that the police act independently during the investigation. In 
France, prosecutors’ professional culture is thus founded on a strict separation 
between police and prosecutorial activities.9 Others have suggested a different 
interpretation. Langbein and Weinreb (who focused on France and Germany) argued 
that prosecutors and examining judges substantially contribute to the shaping of the 
case file. Similarly Field (et al.)10 have argued that prosecutors’ responsibility for the 
construction of the file has a different significance within the (Dutch) inquisitorial 
tradition when compared to the adversarial one.11 This model of judicial supervision 
                                                 
8
 J. Hodgson, French Criminal Justice (Oxford and Portland, 2005), pp. 169-170. This research was 
based on interviews, questionnaires and direct observation.  
9
 J. Hodgson (2001), loc. cit., p. 350-352. The author explains that one of the interviewees said: “We 
[prosecutors] inhabit different worlds. They [police] do not know the world of judges and I do not 
know the world of nightclubs”. See also Hodgson (2005), loc. cit. 
10
 S. Field, P. Alldridge and N. Jörg (1995), loc. cit., p. 237-238. The authors acknowledge that there 
are not detailed empirical studies dealing with these issues. 
11
 On the differences between adversarial and inquisitorial traditions see, for example, A. S. Goldstein, 
‘Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American Criminal Procedure’, Vol. 26 Stanford 
Law Review (1974) pp. 1009-1027. And J. Jackson, ‘The Effect of Human Rights on Criminal 
Evidentiary Processes: Towards Convergence, Divergence or Realignment?’, 68(5) Modern Law 
Review (2005) pp. 737-764, pp. 740-747. See also A. Perrodet, ‘The public prosecutor’, in M. Delmas-
Marty and J. R. Spencer, ed., European Criminal Procedures (Cambridge, 2002, reprinted in 2004) pp. 
415-459, p. 416. Jackson and Perrodet explain that, today, it is no longer possible to grasp all the 
complexity of the different European systems by using the dichotomy ‘accusatorial’ and ‘inquisitorial’. 
Adversarial and inquisitorial are images which reflect a set of ideas and characteristics, but no criminal 
procedure system is, in practice, fully inquisitorial or adversarial. This study is not trying to compare 
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does not eliminate police influence. Prosecuting magistrates, for example, only 
marginally participate in the investigation when the police deal with routine cases. 
This debate is now particularly interesting, because English criminal 
procedure seems to be evolving from a system that has conceived investigation and 
prosecution as strictly separate functions to a system that allows a partial co-
ordination between these two legal actors.12 In 1985 the Crown Prosecution Service 
(CPS) was created, mainly, “to interpose some independent decision making between 
the police decision to charge and the consequent presentation of the prosecution case 
in court”.13 But one of the key principles underlying reform, known as the “Phillips” 
principle, was that investigation and prosecution should remain separate,14 in order to 
guarantee prosecutors’ independence.15  Prosecutors, it was argued, are trained 
lawyers and police are trained investigators and therefore their functions should not be 
blurred. The result was what Jackson called an “uneasy compromise”:16 police 
retained the power to prosecute and the CPS had to “take over” (and either continue or 
discontinue) prosecutions established by the police.17 Within this context the CPS 
necessarily appeared weak, because police retained the initial decision to charge and 
                                                                                                                                            
the practice of prosecution in Italy with these images. These will be useful to discuss relevant literature 
and to set the legal background that influences the way Italian prosecutors operate. 
12
 R. M. White, ‘Investigators and Prosecutors or, Desperately Seeking Scotland: Re-formulation of the 
‘Philips Principle’’, Vol. 69 N. 2 The Modern Law Review (2006) pp. 143-182, p. 182. 
13
 J. Jackson, ‘The Ethical Implications of the Enhanced Role of the Public Prosecutor’, Vol. 9 N. 1 
Legal Ethics (2006) pp. 35-55, p. 47. See also Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, Report, 
Cmnd 8092 (London, HMSO, 1981), chapter 6. 
14
 J. Jackson (2006), loc. cit.,  p. 36. See also, for an analysis of the Philips principle, White, loc. cit. 
15
 R. M. White, loc. cit., pp. 152-153. 
16
 J. Jackson (2006), loc. cit., p. 38. 
17
 Prosecutions of Offences Act 1985, s. 3(2). 
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prosecutors were wholly dependent on the police file and had no legal power to 
request further information.18 Further reforms were later discussed. The Royal 
Commission on Criminal Justice (Runciman) in 1993 looked at judicial supervision in 
France and Germany to understand how “an inquisitorial pre-trial figure [the 
prosecutor] [might] fit into the established [adversarial, in England] roles of police, 
prosecutor, and defence lawyer”.19 The Commission concluded that, in inquisitorial 
systems, in the vast majority of the cases, prosecutors’ control is merely formal.20 So, 
the CPS would not be effective at investigating or supervising the investigation 
conducted by the police.21 It was also considered that a confusion of roles could lead 
to increased resentment and argument between the police and prosecutors and could 
affect prosecutors’ objectivity.22 More recently, the Auld report discussed the 
difficulties caused by the application of the Phillips principle and, as a consequence, 
the principles on which a closer liaison between the CPS and the police should be 
based.23 The argument was that “the CPS has still to fulfil its proper role”.24 This is 
based on different reasons, including lack of co-operation between the police and 
prosecutors.25 Now, under the statutory charging scheme,26 the CPS has the power to 
                                                 
18
 J. Jackson (2006), loc. cit., p. 38-39. 
19
 S. Field, ‘Judicial Supervision and the Pre-Trial Process’, 21 Journal of Law and Society (1994) pp. 
119-135, p. 121. 
20
 Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, Report, (London, HMSO, 1992), p. 13 
21




 Auld LJ, Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales: Report. London. TSO. 2001. See 
also, R. M. White, loc. cit., pp. 174-176. 
24
 Auld LJ, loc. cit., ch 10, para 12. 
25
 R. M. White, loc. cit., p. 175. 
26
 PACE Act 1984 (as amended by the CJA 2003), s. 37B. 
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charge suspects in all but very minor cases27 and prosecutors are now based in police 
stations. This has rectified some of the weaknesses concerning the relationship 
between the CPS and the police.28 But the police are still in charge of the investigation 
and custody officers still have a crucial “gate-keeping” role.29 It is their responsibility 
to decide which cases should be considered for prosecution. In this sense, police 
officers still retain the power to release detainees with no further action (NFA) being 
taken.30  
Thus White has argued that the police-prosecutor relationship in England and 
Wales has developed into one in which it is partially accepted that investigation and 
prosecution are co-ordinate and not separate functions.31 The argument of this article 
is certainly not that English criminal justice has internalized judicial supervision as 
this concept is understood in inquisitorial systems. The legal theoretical context is 
different, namely that in England prosecutors do not have any legal power to control 
the investigation and direct police. So, there is no possible direct comparison with 
Italy. However, the analysis of the Italian case can contribute to the understanding of 
the conditions that determine the extent to which judicial supervision is effective 
when based on direction. Consequently, this should contribute to the more general 
debate about the conceptualization of prosecutors’ role in contemporary criminal 
                                                 
27
 S. 28 and Sched 2, amending PACE Act 1984 s 37 (creating the new s 37B). See also A. Sanders and 
R. Young, Criminal Justice (Oxford, 3rd edition, 2007) pp. 332-333. 
28




 A. Sanders and R. Young, loc. cit., pp. 328-329. The authors underline that this involves a large 
number of suspects (20-25%) and police officers have no duty to report non-prosecuted cases to the 
CPS. 
31
 R. M. White, loc. cit., p. 182. 
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justice systems. As Jackson has commented: there is “a lack of clarity as to what the 
role of the modern prosecutor is.”32  
 
3. The relationship police-prosecutor in Italy: legal context and 
prosecutors’ institutional role 
 
Italian criminal justice has traditionally been inquisitorial. Inquisitorial criminal 
procedures during the pre-trial phase are based on certain specific requirements. The 
police must report offences to the investigating magistrate (examining judge or 
prosecutor) who opens a file. The police are placed at the disposal of investigating 
magistrates who have the legal power to supervise the investigation, to directly carry 
out investigative activities and to charge.33 
Until recently, Italian criminal procedure was not an exception to this model.34 
But in 1989, 35 years after Parliament had started to debate the wholesale reform of 
criminal procedure, a renewed criminal justice system was designed.35 This was now 
meant to be adversarial. The examining judge was abolished. Instead the investigation 
                                                 
32
 J. Jackson (2006), loc. cit., p. 47. 
33
 See, for example, A. S. Goldstein and M. Marcus, loc. cit., p. 247.  
34
 See, for example, T. Pizzi and L. Marafioti, ‘The New Italian Code of Criminal Procedure: The 
Difficulties of Building an Adversarial Trial System on a Civil Law Foundation’ Vol. 17 n. 1 The Yale 
Journal of International Law (1992) pp. 1-40, pp. 3-5.   
35
 See d. P. R. n. 447/1988. This means decreto del Presidente della Repubblica. It is a piece of 
delegated legislation issued (formally, the government prepares and is responsible for delegated 
legislation) by the President of the Republic. In this case the dPR was implementing the legge delega n. 
81/1987. A legge delega is a parent act enabling the government to pass measures which have the force 
of law. Of course, the aim of this legge delega was to reform the code of criminal procedure. 
 12 
was now to be formally undertaken by the prosecutor who would supervise and direct 
the police36 in a system in which the trial was to be seen as an open confrontation 
between the parties.37 Within this legal context police functions during the pre-trial 
phase38 are: receiving notifications of crime and discovering crimes; managing the 
consequences of a crime (e. g. restoring public order); conducting investigations 
(under the prosecutor’s direction); securing evidence; performing any act useful to the 
                                                 
36
 In Italy there is a distinction between the polizia amministrativa, which has the function of 
preventing crime; and the polizia giudiziaria (PG) which deals with the investigation together with 
prosecutors (prosecutors can directly carry out investigative acts (art. 370 para. 1 Italian code of 
criminal procedure, cpp.). So, the PG are police officers (just like the polizia amministrativa) but they 
primarily deal with crime investigation. They are not a separate police force. This article is only dealing 
with the PG. However, the impact of the polizia amministrativa during the pre-trial phase should not be 
underestimated: they too (like the PG) come across and collect crime reports. 
37
 For a legal analysis of the new Italian code of criminal procedure see, for example, L. Marafioti 
‘Italian Criminal Procedure: A System Caught Between Two Traditions’, in J. Jackson, M. Langer and 
P. Tillers, ed., Crime, Procedure and Evidence in Comparative and International Context. Essays in 
Hnour of Professor Mirjan Damaška (Oxford and Portland, 2008) pp. 81-99. J. J. Miller, ‘Plea bargain 
and its analogues under the new Italian criminal procedure code and in the United States: towards a 
new understanding of comparative criminal procedure’ 22 N. Y. U. Journal of International Law and 
Politics (1989-1990) pp. 215-251. T. Pizzi and L. Marafioti, loc. cit. L. J. Fassler, ‘The Italian Penal 
Procedure Code: An Adversarial System of Criminal Procedure in Continental Europe’ 29 Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law (1991) pp. 245-278. L. F. Del Duca, ‘An Historic Convergence of Civil 
and Common Law Systems-Italy’s New “Adversarial” Criminal Procedure System’ Vol. 10:1 
Dickinson Journal of International Law (1991) pp. 73-92. S. P. Freccero, ‘An Introduction to the New 
Italian Criminal Procedure’ Vol. 21 n. 3 American Journal of Criminal Law (1994) pp. 345-383. And 
E. Amodio and E. Selvaggi, ‘An Accusatorial System in a Civil Law Country: the 1988 Italian Code of 
Criminal Procedure’ Vol. 62 Temple Law Review (1989) pp. 1211-1224. 
38
 In certain circumstances these functions can also be carried out on their own initiative (see art. 55 
and 348 cpp). 
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prosecution; and limiting the consequences of a crime.39 They also retain powers that 
can be activated by prosecutors or, to a certain extent, exercised autonomously. First, 
police officers may carry out investigative acts on their own initiative from the 
moment they receive notification of a crime to the moment the prosecutor begins to 
direct the investigation. Secondly, they can perform investigative acts under 
prosecutors’ delegated authority (the so called delega40). Thirdly, police have the duty 
to communicate ‘without delay’ (sometimes immediately) the crime reports they 
discover to prosecutors. Finally, the police retain their powers in relation to the 
investigation even though prosecutors are supervising the case. 
In Italy the police-prosecutor relationship is also built around the principle, 
stated in the Italian code of criminal procedure (art. 56 and 327 code of criminal 
procedure (cpp), that police are functionally but not organizationally dependent upon 
prosecutors.41 This conceptual distinction between dipendenza funzionale (functional 
dependence) and dipendenza organizzativa (organizational dependence) is complex 
and needs clarification. Functional dependence means that superiors have the right to 
determine what subordinates do. Organizational dependence means that superiors 
have the right to manage the organization (e. g. career, promotions, transfers, 
allocation of resources) of their subordinates. The police officers (polizia giudiziaria, 
PG) that carry out investigative activities are functionally dependent on prosecutors 
                                                 
39
 See, for example, G. P. Voena, ‘Soggetti’, in G. Conso and V. Grevi, ed., Compendio di Procedura 
Penale (Padova, 2nd edn, 2003) pp. 57-111, pp. 80-84. See also (in general for the role and the 
functions of PG) A. Scaglione, L’attività ad iniziativa della polizia giudiziaria (Torino, 2001).  
40
 The delega is very similar to the French commission rogatoire. When prosecutors issue a delega it 
means that they delegated to police the authority to perform investigative acts. A delega is, of course, 
not necessary when police officers retain autonomous powers to investigate.   
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but organizationally dependent on their hierarchical superiors within the police. But 
the degree of functional and organizational dependence may vary depending on the 
type of police officer.42 Here it is important to distinguish between the terms sezioni 
(sections) and servizi (services). The sezioni of the PG are immediately and directly 
dependent on prosecutors.43 This means that prosecutors can use these police officers 
to carry out investigative acts without the prior intervention of hierarchical superiors 
within the police.44 These officers are exclusively dedicated to crime investigation. 
But, unlike the sezioni, the PG units known as servizi (services) perform other 
functions in addition to crime investigation45 and are directly managed and controlled 
by higher-ranking police officers who legally take the decision as to which and how 
many police officers will be assigned to the investigation.46 This clearly reduces 
prosecutors’ powers to control and direct the investigation and makes the units of the 
servizi less functional dependent upon prosecutors. 
In theory, Italian criminal procedure still firmly puts the investigation under 
the direction of prosecutors. But, as always, if one wants to understand Italy, it is 
necessary to look beyond the formal legal rules. Giostra has argued that the legal 
                                                                                                                                            
41
 See art. 56 and 327 cpp. 
42
 For a general discussion about functional and organizational dependence of PG’s officers see, for 
example, G. P. Voena, loc. cit., pp. 84-90. 
43
 Ibid. pp. 86-87. 
44
 Ibid. pp. 87 and 89. 
45
 They also work as polizia amministrativa, see above n 36. 
46
 AP(N48) said: “If I need police forces for an investigation which is not perceived as a priority by 
police hierarchical superiors, it can be a problem. They will never tell you that they will not support 
you, but if you do not get the best men […] Yes, it has happened, even for serious cases, but the point 
is: who considers these cases to be serious?”. 
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framework de facto allows two distinct investigations, one before the case is referred 
to the prosecutor, the other afterwards. Art 347, para 1, cpp states that the PG must 
refer crime reports to prosecutors “without delay” and no longer specifies, as it used 
to in the original version of the 1989 reform, within 48 hours.47 The expression 
“without delay” (which certainly can extend to 48 hours) appears very broad. This 
potentially leaves the police with the power to take decisions at the beginning of the 
investigation (before reporting to the pubblico ministero).48 Giostra claims that police 
now have the right to determine the initial strategy and direction of the investigation.49 
In other words, the legal rules seem to have created a substantial distinction during the 
pre-trial phase: police perform the investigative acts; prosecutors deal with the 
result.50 Prosecutors’ pivotal role during the investigation may also be undermined by 
                                                 
47
 G. Giostra, ‘Pubblico ministero e polizia giudiziaria nel processo di parti’, in Centro Nazionale di 
Prevenzione e Difesa Sociale. Convegni di studio <<Enrico De Nicola>>: Problemi attuali di diritto e 
procedra penale (conference papers) Il pubblico ministero oggi (Milano, 1994) pp. 179-190, p. 180. See 
also, for example, F. Cordero, Procedura penale (Milano, 2000) p. 808. In 1992 the government issued 
a decreto legge (D.L.) to amend the 1989 reform. A D.L. is a piece of delegated legislation that the 
government can issue (without any parent act) when it is necessary to do so. However, the parliament 
must convert the decreto into an Act (art. 77 cost.). This was the D.L. n. 306/1992 which was 
subsequently converted (with amendments) into the Act n. 356/1992. This amended art. 347 cpp. Now 
PG must refer the crime report to prosecutors “without delay” and not within 48 hours. 
48
 G. Giostra, loc. cit., p.180. 
49
 Ibid. See also Nannucci who claims that, there is not now one figure (the prosecutor) who is leading 
the investigation and one figure (police) who has important but subordinate powers (subordinate to 
prosecutors’ directives). Both these figures are legally entitled autonomously to conduct investigative 
acts. U. Nannucci ‘Pubblico ministero e polizia giudiziaria nel processo di parti’, in Centro Nazionale 
di Prevenzione e Difesa Sociale, loc. cit., pp. 180-194, p. 176. 
50
 G. Giostra, loc. cit., p.181. 
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the distinction between sections (sezioni) and services (servizi). As Voena has noted, 
prosecutors can directly use the sections, there is no ‘filter’ from police officers’ 
hierarchical superiors.51 But when the units known as servizi are involved, prosecutors 
have to ask if services are available (or better, if the officers they want are available) 
for the investigation. This is not a mere legalistic distinction. In practice, if the 
investigation is or becomes complicated (e. g. involves many accused persons, certain 
difficult investigative acts have to be carried out) prosecutors will have to contact the 
services. The reasons are both quantitative and qualitative. There are many more 
police officers in the services than the sections. And the services also include some 
specialised units such as those dealing with organised crime.52 
The complexity of prosecutors’ role during the pre-trial phase is also reflected 
by the general normative principles that form the Italian criminal justice system. As 
noted at the outset, Italian criminal procedure is a mixture of adversarial and 
inquisitorial principles. This is visible in the whole structure of the 1989 reform.53 
Prosecutors are considered to be a party to criminal proceedings from the beginning of 
the investigation.54 Supporting the prosecution does not, however, fully describe their 
functions and professional values. They are also responsible for the correct 
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application of the law.55 This underpins the ideology of public prosecutors, which is 
rooted in legal values and a professional culture that designates prosecutors, in 
accordance with the inquisitorial tradition,56 as neutral quasi-judicial figures.57 This is 
the traditional interpretation of prosecutorial functions that developed under the pre-
1989 code.58 The legal structure effectively substantiates this interpretation. In the 
current system, judges and prosecutors belong to the same professional category. 
They are both part of the judiciary. They share the same career path and can switch 
functions. Finally, prosecutors, like judges, are fully independent of any other 
constitutional power (e.g. the executive).59 This institutional context is, to a certain 
extent, protected by the legality principle (art. 112 Italian constitution, cost.) which 
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states that pubblici ministeri are bound to prosecute all crimes. The Italian 
constitutional fathers thought that “independence and mandatory prosecution [were] 
two faces of the same coin”.60 These concepts are meant to be the projection into the 
criminal justice system of the principle of equality before the law, which is also stated 
in the constitution (art. 3).61 
The continued accuracy of this interpretation of the prosecutorial role has been 
widely criticised. For example, Grande argues that, since the 1989 adversarial reform, 
prosecutors have become “straight accusers”.62 The author refers to Cordero who 
says: “if the prosecutor disregards [evidence favourable to the suspect], looking just in 
one direction, he/she risks a failure at trial or even before at the preliminary hearing; 
that the prosecutor must also consider the suspect’s side is a matter of elementary 
caution”.63 This interpretation reduces the emphasis on prosecutors’ judicial distance 
and emphasizes the adversarial nature of Italian criminal procedure. Prosecutors’ goal 
is to construct a case which will stand scrutiny at trial64 and not to search for the legal 
and factual truth. 
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It is difficult to argue that judicial supervision is not a distinctive feature of 
Italian criminal procedure. There is also some evidence, like prosecutors’ quasi-
judicial status, which continues to support the argument that Italian judicial 
supervision reflects inquisitorial theory. However, there are also ambiguities that 
suggest prosecutors are not firmly in the position to control the investigation. There is, 
therefore, the need to look at the practice to understand the nature and the meaning of 
directing the investigation. 
 
4. The law in action 
 
The analysis of judicial supervision in terms of relevant legal norms is certainly 
complicated. But its practical adaptations are even more difficult to grasp. What does 
it mean in practice to say that prosecutors direct the investigation? Do prosecutors 
supervise all the cases in the same way? What are, in practice, the police’s powers? 
These questions have been partially analyzed in the academic literature. As 
noted, Goldstein and Marcus conclude that judicial supervision does not exist and is 
mythical. The Italian academic literature is more extensive, but is still not founded on 
major empirical studies. Research has concentrated on two issues: prosecutors’ 
professional culture during the pre-trial phase and the methods pubblici ministeri use 
to direct the investigation. Di Federico, like Goldstein and Marcus, has tried to 
demonstrate that the legal rules that designate prosecutors as impartial judicial figures 
are not properly implemented. The author claims that during the pre-trial phase, 
prosecutors “acquire the typical characteristics that police officers have”.65 Two 
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observations can be made. First, Di Federico’s and Sapignoli’s empirical study (from 
which these conclusions were derived) was based on interviews exclusively 
conducted with lawyers. Secondly, their study did not directly concern the police-
prosecutor relationship, but rather the way accused persons’ rights were respected by 
pubblici ministeri. 
The second issue, the methods used by prosecutors to supervise investigations, 
is particularly important for the purposes of this article. There are suggestions that 
prosecutors’ supervision of the investigation may vary depending on the case. Volume 
crimes (e.g. street crime) are mainly investigated and dealt with by the police and the 
prosecutors’ function becomes that of police legal advisor.66 That is a sort of 
‘routinised bureaucratic’ review of the results of the investigation.67 On the other 
hand, for serious cases prioritised by prosecutors, they become the directors of the 
investigation. They coordinate the police and effectively take investigative 
initiatives.68 This closer form of judicial supervision does not imply that prosecutors 
directly carry out investigative acts. Police officers are forced to delegate the 
investigation to police officers under delega,69 because the volume of crimes is too 
great. However, this practice is encouraged by the fact that prosecutors trust police 
professionalism.70 
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Thus Vogliotti and Sarzotti’s views emphasise that there seem to be two 
methods of directing the investigation depending on the seriousness of the case. 
However, neither Sarzotti nor Vogliotti give a detailed explanation of how the two 
different styles of supervision work in practice. In the following sections, empirical 
data based on interviews conducted with prosecutors, police officers and lawyers will 
be used to provide the detailed description of practice on the ground. Three different 
issues will be addressed: the meaning of “directing the investigation”; the way 
prosecutors supervise the investigation of cases that they do and do not prioritise; and 
the way the police can influence their choices. 
 
5. Directing the investigation: the distinctive role of assigned police 
officers 
 
To understand the police-prosecutor relationship in Italy during the investigation it is 
necessary to explain the peculiar position of “assigned” police officers.71 These are 
officers from the sezioni (sections) of the PG (investigative police) who, as we have 
seen, are functionally and, to a certain extent, organizationally dependent on 
prosecutors. 
If the prosecution office is of medium size or larger, each prosecutor has a 
certain number of police officers “assigned” to him/her.72 This means that they work 
exclusively for that specific prosecutor. The professional closeness between these 
legal actors is so strong that pubblici ministeri normally call these police officers “my 
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police officers” or “my collaborators”. This connection is further strengthened by the 
fact that sometimes they work in the same building. Obviously these police officers 
can not deal with every case. Sometimes specific preparation/knowledge is required 
or, simply, an increased number of investigators is necessary. In these situations 
prosecutors will involve other police officers who do not exclusively work for them. 
Prosecutors call them the “external” police and they are part of the sezioni.73  
Perhaps the most interesting feature of the relationship between “assigned” 
police officers and prosecutors is the latter’s power to organize, train and manage 
their police officers: 
I have a very efficient ufficio.74 In fact, my collaborators are very well prepared, and I 
have spent some time training them, so that now they perform efficiently. […] The point 
here is that I tried to apply that project, which has never really been applied, concerning 
the ufficio del pubblico ministero. This means that the prosecutor is the director of his 
ufficio and he/she [only] carries out the activities which can not be delegated; these are: 
the hearings and the preparation of the hearings. The vast majority of the other activities 
are performed by my collaborators; I only read, double check, correct and sign.75 
   
The idea of “ufficio del pubblico ministero”  seems to be that of setting up a 
team that can cope with legal, administrative and investigative tasks. Prosecutors 
become the managers of the teams (and the coaches as well because they have to train 
their personnel). This means that their police officers (and administrative staff) are 
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taught how to prepare a file, to conduct the investigation and to report to prosecutors. 
In other words: they are taught how to prepare, in a reasonable amount of time, a file 
that will stand scrutiny at trial. This power is not only left to the initiative of the single 
prosecutor. In one of the sites visited, the chief prosecutor issued a circular in which 
he explicitly suggested that prosecutors set up and organise their office/team in order 
to find the best practices to deal with volume crimes.76 
The ufficio del pubblico ministero appears therefore to be a versatile system 
for organizing prosecutorial activities. The objective should be one of efficiency and 
prosecutors are in charge of defining the practical rules to achieve it. This certainly 
emphasises prosecutors’ exercise of discretionary powers, but the potential influence 
of these police officers should not be underestimated. Prosecutors are still partially 
dependent upon “assigned” police officers who carry out various important activities. 
Within this context policing means: to be directly involved in investigations; to 
prepare the files (including writing the charges);77 and to chase files that have been 
assigned to the “external” police. This last function is crucially important. In practice, 
police officers can become the prosecutor’s ‘eyes’ checking that the investigation is 
carried out properly and on time.78 “Assigned” police officers are thus multifunctional 
professional figures who extend the supervisory ‘reach’ of the prosecutor. 
In the end, the activities that ‘assigned’ police officers carry out seem to be 
prompted, directed and managed by prosecutors. Yet prosecutors themselves remain 
dependent upon and influenced by “assigned” police officers who shape 
investigations in important ways. So, there is a strong functional interdependence 




 L(N20) . 
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 AP(N1), AP(N2) and AP(N3). 
 24 
between pubblici ministeri and “their” police officers. This analysis also demonstrates 
that supervision appears to be an office bound job, with little direct involvement in the 
investigation. However, this does not necessarily mean that prosecutors are mere 
passive figures. On the contrary, in Italy, prosecutors actively decide on the functions 
that “assigned” police officers must carry out. Finally, the interdependence and strong 
co-ordination between prosecutors and “assigned” police officers did not seem to have 
created a problematic professional relationship. Instead, their relationship is based on 
co-operation and trust. And, although the police and prosecutors’ functions may 
overlap, their role is not confused. Prosecutors are the directors; the police are the 
executors.    
 
6. Directing the investigation: prompting and reviewing 
 
As above, the legal concept of judicial supervision is expressed through the 
interrelationship between the prosecutors’ power to direct the investigation and police 
power to carry out investigative acts autonomously. In the next two sections the 
meaning, in practice, of the concept of directing the investigation will be described. 
Firstly, it will be explained how prosecutors supervise the investigation when they 
have prioritised a case and, secondly, their approach when they believe the case is not 
important.79 The police-prosecutor relationship when investigations are carried out 
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(by police) under delega and the practical consequences of prosecutors’ decision to 
directly carry out investigation activities will also be discussed. 
But, first a preliminary point needs to be clarified. As explained in the 
previous section, the distinction between ‘assigned’ and ‘external’ police matters for 
two reasons. First, it illustrates the importance (just in the context of the investigation) 
of police activities during the pre-trial phase and secondly, how extensive 
prosecutors’ powers to manage police officers may be (in certain circumstances). But 
this distinction is less important when the different styles of supervision are discussed. 
Prosecutors are more involved in the investigation if they believe that the case is 
important and must be prioritised regardless of the type of police officer. So, in the 
next sections, the word police will be used without distinguishing between ‘assigned’ 
and ‘external’ police. 
When prosecutors have prioritised a case the police-prosecutor relationship 
appears to be based on constant communications between these two legal actors. 
Prosecutors and the police discuss the investigation on a regular basis. In practice, 
police officers keep going backwards and forwards, performing a particular 
investigative act and then reporting back to the prosecutor.80 This “backwards and 
forward” system is not one where police carry out all the investigative acts and only 
then refer back to the prosecutor. On the contrary, the police report to prosecutors 
regularly, and, sometimes, after every single act conducted. 
At first glance prosecutorial activities at this stage appear passive and reactive, 
but this description is not complete. Reviewing often (or always) leads to more 
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activity. In other words, the review of police investigation is instrumental to the 
issuing of detailed guidelines about future investigative strategies. This, in practice, 
means that prosecutors carefully list the investigations police must carry out.  Within 
this very practical context prosecutors can be rightly regarded as “authenticating” 
authorities,81 if this means that they review police activities. But, at least when the 
case has been prioritized, prosecutors seem to be both proactive and reactive in their 
treatment of police reports. One of the lawyers I interviewed said: “Prosecutors 
intervene later. They act after every investigative act that the police have performed 
and that prosecutors have told them to carry out [emphasis added]”.82 And one 
prosecutor very clearly said: “For the cases where the investigation is complicated we 
normally give instructions and then, every time we receive the results, we issue new 
instructions”.83 This seems to confirm that “reaction” is just one of the elements that 
build up this style of supervision. 
Thus when prosecutors prioritized a case “directing the investigation” means 
that they will carry out two main functions: prompting and reviewing. Prosecutors 
issue instructions and the police implement them. Prosecutors will subsequently 
review the results and, if necessary, will issue new instructions. This is the meaning of 
the “back (reviewing) and forward (prompting)” system that was described above. 
And this shows that judicial supervision is not only a matter of performing a 
bureaucratic review of police’s activities. It also involves pubblici ministeri prompting 
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with inputs which shape the way police carry out the investigation. So, directing is, to 
a certain extent, similar to planning. Prosecutors have a plan about the investigation 
and they ask the police to execute it. Obviously, the plan is influenced by the 
information provided by the police.  
Prosecutors’ instructions to carry out the investigation are transmitted via the 
delega, which is a written document: 
The more the delega is detailed the more the investigation will be shaped by the 
prosecutor […] If the delega is not detailed the police’s powers, which are already 
quite strong, will increase. I think that the deleghe [plural of delega] should be very 
detailed, even when the case is not so important; however I always leave a certain 
amount of freedom to police84 […] If the prosecutor really wants to play his part he 
has to act like this. However, if the case is less important the delega will be less 
detailed, but still it has to be precise.85 
 
It is interesting to note that one prosecutor said that prior to the 1989 reform 
issuing a detailed delega was viewed as an unusual interference. Police officers 
perceived this as a lack of trust in their capacity to perform a good investigation. On 
the contrary, he said, now police are expecting a detailed delega. This is considered 
(by prosecutors and the police) the right way to proceed.86 However, in the next 
section it will be noted that, for the cases which have not been prioritised, deleghe are 
not always detailed and, sometimes, leave a great amount of initiative to the police. 
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Finally, note that the delega is not the only means prosecutors have to 
communicate with the police. Pubblici ministeri can also direct the police by phone 
and by setting up regular meetings.87 This does not mean that, in these cases, the 
delega will not be issued but that prosecutors will use the systems which are more 
suitable to guarantee that they will be always kept informed and that the police will 
execute the prosecutors’ directives. 
The large number of crime reports received by prosecution offices prevents 
prosecutors from directly carrying out investigation activities in the vast majority of 
the cases.88 This is why a detailed delega is so important. There are however 
situations when prosecutors are more active. They carry out investigation activities 
when they believe this is necessary or the case is very important. However, this is not 
a separate style of supervision. Prosecutors only carry out some investigative acts 
when they also prompting through guidelines and reviewing information. So, carrying 
out investigation activities is a sort of ‘extra’ function added to the prompting and 
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reviewing system, but it does not significantly change the nature of this style of 
judicial supervision.  
Prosecutors can directly interview certain witnesses and/or accused person(s). 
So, for example, they interview the collaboratori di giustizia89 particularly for 
organised crime and terrorism cases. The same seems to happen when minors are 
implicated and have been sexually or otherwise abused. These are clearly situations 
which require a lot of sensitivity and prosecutors know from the beginning that they 
want to carry out these interviews. However, prosecutors do not just decide a priori to 
perform investigative acts in particular types of cases (e. g. murder, organised crime 
etc.). They may also choose to “step in” because they are perplexed by the evidence 
obtained by the police, simply want to reanalyze it or want to oversee the 
implementation of a particular investigative act (i. e. to ask specific questions). The 
decision to “step in” is normally influenced by the way the investigation is evolving. 
But police reports are still vital information for prosecutors and can significantly 
influence this choice: 
It was my first case of homicide. It was during the night, the police called and said there was a 
dead man on the side of a road and that they thought it was an accident. I told them to check 
for evidence and to do, themselves, the routine activities (e. g. prevent people contaminating 
the area, search around etc.). Then they called me back to tell me that, close to the body, they 
had found a car. Again, I said to continue with the searching activities. Later they called me 
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again to tell me that they found that the dead person had a hole behind the head (similar to a 
bullet hole). So, I said to close off the whole area and to wait for me. Then they sent me a car 
and I was there in 15 min.90 
 
In the end, the element which seems most to characterise the prompting and 
reviewing form of supervision is the fact that police and prosecutors constantly 
interact and communicate. Interaction does not necessarily imply confusion of roles, 
but it carries a substantial amount of interdependence. Even when detailed deleghe 
have been issued, investigative acts will be mainly carried out by police officers. So, it 
appears misleading to look at the “prompting and reviewing” system as a method by 
which prosecutors eliminate police influence; but it would be probably correct to see 
it as the best tool that pubblici ministeri have to mediate police influences during the 
investigation. It is difficult to define precisely how influential Italian prosecutors can 
be at this stage of the proceedings. They certainly rely very much on the information 
collected by police officers and, as a consequence, the powers to direct the 
investigation may be, in practice, limited. So, similarly to Hodgson’s conclusions 
about the French system, the information provided by police restricts prosecutors’ 
powers. However, when the case has been prioritised prosecutors’ powers to direct the 
investigation potentially balance police powers to carry out investigative acts. In this 
way, judicial supervision becomes effective. 
These considerations seem to suggest some differences in relation to studies of 
judicial supervision in other continental jurisdictions. Goldstein and Marcus say that 
“prosecutors and examining judges do little more that confirm what police have 




done”;91 and define prosecutors’ role during the pre-trial phase as passive and 
reactive.92 Hodgson suggests that, in France, judicial supervision in practice does not 
empower prosecutors to challenge or go beyond “the case parameters set by police”.93 
More generally, Mathias does not see, in practice, a significant difference between the 
police-prosecutor relationship in continental Europe when compared to England. Italy 
(like, for example, Germany and France) is used as an example to describe the 
converging practices between adversarial and inquisitorial systems. These practices 
emphasize prosecutors’ ineffectiveness and the practical domination of police during 
the pre-trial phase.94 These differences may certainly be linked to the fact that 
different jurisdictions operate in different ways, but there may be other explanations. 
Goldstein and Marcus tried to define general characteristics across the Italian, French 
and German criminal justice systems. Hodgson concentrated on one style of 
supervision in France. Here different methods of supervision have been identified. 
These may suggest the dangers of over-generalization. Obviously, the central 
argument is not that judicial supervision is conducted in the same way everywhere. 
But the differences between the findings of this article and of studies previously cited 
may also be in the subtlety of analytical distinctions as much as jurisdictional 
differences. Thus, the argument presented here is that when police and prosecutorial 
activities are co-ordinated, prosecutors may, under certain conditions, have sufficient 
resources to limit the impact of police interests and values. 
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7. Directing the investigation: bureaucratic review 
 
Bureaucratic review is a different form of supervision to the “prompting and 
reviewing” system. It concerns volume crimes that prosecutors, in general, do not 
prioritise. Sometimes, deleghe are not issued. In these situations police will have 
substantial powers to perform the investigative acts they want to carry out provided 
they follow legal rules. This form of supervision is mainly carried out “on paper”.95 
And the moments of interaction with police are rare. These only take place at two 
points: at the beginning of the investigation (if the delega has been issued) and at the 
end when pubblici ministeri review the results. 
In theory prosecutors should participate more when certain investigative acts 
have to be performed. These are, for example, seizures, searches and/or telephone 
tapping, which must be authorised by prosecutors. The clearest example is surely 
arrest. The police are in charge of the decision to arrest (sometimes it is compulsory) 
but prosecutors must intervene immediately. The code of criminal procedure states 
that police must immediately report to prosecutors that an arrest has been carried out 
(art. 386 para. 1 cpp) and they must, as soon as possible (and no later than 24 hours), 
put the arrested person(s) in contact with the prosecutor (art. 386 para. 3 cpp, this 
literally says: “at prosecutor’s disposal”). Then, only the prosecutor can interview the 
person(s) under arrest (art. 388 para. 3 cpp). At this stage the prosecutor, de facto, 
must review the arrest procedure because the law requires that he/she decides either 
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that the arrested person(s) must be immediately set free (art. 389 cpp) or that the arrest 
was lawful and must be validated by a judge (art. 390 cpp.), in this case there will be 
an hearing, called “validating hearing” (art. 391 cpp). This is the impression given by 
the legal norms but the practice may be considerably different. Pubblici ministeri are 
legally activated and should oversee the implementation of certain investigative acts 
but this only happens if the case is a priority. For example, street crime often involves 
arrested persons, but it is not perceived as a serious crime by Italian prosecutors. So, 
in practice, these investigations are bureaucratically supervised even when they 
require a prompt intervention by the prosecutor.  
One of the best examples of the prosecutors’ bureaucratic review form of 
supervision is the SDAS96 group in Milan. This is a group which deals with cases 
which have not been prioritised. These can be defamations, small frauds, car accidents 
etc. There are 6 prosecutors and one deputy chief prosecutor who, amongst other 
functions, manage the SDAS. They claim to treat approximately 80% of the cases 
which arrive at the Milan prosecution office.97 Within the SDAS group, not only do 
police provide prosecutors with the information they need to take decisions, they also 
present possible solutions for the cases. In other words: they suggest the decisions 
prosecutors should take. Pubblici ministeri can balance police extensive powers by 
reviewing their activities and, more importantly, they can also issue guidelines that 
police officers will follow when they will have to prepare the official documents 
which will form part of the prosecution file. 
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There is an obvious “checks and balances” discourse between policing and 
prosecuting in the SDAS but, in practice, prosecutors’ power to review police activity 
appears limited. Pubblici ministeri seem to rely very much on the police’s opinion (i. 
e. “you can trust them, because they know what they are doing”). They do not very 
often seem to review and correct the documents prepared by the police.98 There is, 
however, one last resource available to prosecutors. If they consider that a case does 
need further and deeper investigation, they can treat it personally and remove it from 
the SDAS group. Thus, prosecutors still maintain their right to make important 
choices on the style of judicial supervision that should be applied to an investigation. 
The consequence, in practice, seems to be that the form of supervision can change (“I 
will involve my personal police99 with whom I have contacts everyday”).100 In 
particular, when cases are removed from the SDAS group, prosecutors do not only 
review the information provided by the police, they can also prompt through 
directives (i. e. ask police to interview someone). However, it seems clear that these 
cases will never have a high priority (“For my cases [the priorities] I spend much 
more time”.101). As a consequence prosecutors’ preparedness to use their rights to 
influence the way the investigation is performed and the case is treated is limited. 
 The detailed descriptions made in this section lead to interesting conclusions. 
This analysis seems to provide a more nuanced and contingent portrayal of judicial 




 These can be the “assigned” police officers. However, prosecutors can also set up strict relationships 
with police officers who are specialised in treating the same kind of cases that prosecutors deal with in 






supervision than that which emerges from the dominant academic literature on its 
operation within inquisitorial systems. In particular, there are a variety of choices that 
Italian prosecutors can make: 
Anyway, there is always the power to decide [emphasis added]: when they give me 
the posta102 I read and then I decide. In particular, if I believe that no crime has been 
committed (e. g. the victim initiation of querela103 was after the time limit); then I can 
immediately take a decision, because police have already done everything, I decide; 
otherwise I think about the crime which has possibly been committed and then I issue 
a delega. If the crime is a priority I go to the crime site and I start directing the 
investigation […] In general [for volume crimes] police perform the investigation and 
then they refer to me. However, if there is a priority my deleghe are very detailed, [in 
these cases] police only have residual powers to take discretionary decisions about the 
investigative acts to carry out.104 
 
The significance of the “power to decide” should not be overestimated. The 
information on which prosecutors will base their decisions seems to depend very 
much on the police’s initiative on the investigative acts to be performed, but 
prosecutors are still in the position to determine certain crucial matters. Is the case a 
priority or not? Do police need close supervision? Do I need to carry out investigative 
acts? How should a delega be drafted? And, more important, is it a prosecutable case? 
This presents a rational image of a variable degree of intervention shaped by the 
necessities of the case.  However, it should be remembered that these conclusions are 
based on interview evidence rather than independent case-file analysis. Such analysis 
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might reveal occasions where prosecutors are not aware of the complexities or 
importance of a case because they can only judge on the basis of the (police) reports 
they receive.  
Finally, the main consequence created by the choice to bureaucratically 
supervise an investigation is that prosecutors’ power to prompt by directives seems to 
be confined to the initial, generally not-detailed, delega. The result is that prosecutors 
do not seem to have their “hands on” the investigation. However, as Hodgson 
underlines for the French case: “This bureaucratic form of supervision, although 
relatively passive, has the potential benefit of filtering out obviously weak cases 
where the basic elements of an offence are not made out or where there has been a 
failure to comply with or document basic procedural safeguards”.105 The same 






Sanders has argued that “cases cannot ever be dispassionately and accurately screened 
by any organization if all the information used to do the screening is provided by the 
organization being screened.”106 This emphasises the limits and ineffectiveness of 
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prosecutorial functions during the pre-trial phase, but there is an assumption that 
prosecutors are meant to closely supervise the police and, more generally, the 
investigation. In this article a different perspective has been presented. Italy is the 
example to demonstrate that, if certain conditions are satisfied, the practice of 
prosecution is not always dominated by the police even if cases are not closely 
supervised. Two models of judicial supervision have been described. The key 
distinction between these models stems from the number of interactions between 
prosecutors and police. The more these two legal actors interact, the more prosecutors 
can effectively supervise the investigation. These models may not reflect, in practice, 
the rules established in the Italian code of criminal procedure. In other words: judicial 
supervision in Italy, like everywhere else, does not mean that every investigation is 
closely scrutinised, but it can still be effective. Moreover, Hodgson explains that in 
France police and prosecutors inhabit different worlds.107 This can be suggested for 
Italy as well: police carry out investigative activities; prosecutors review and, 
sometimes, prompt these activities, and, as in France, even in Italy police and 
prosecutors’ professional ideologies appear very different. However, this difference 
does not prevent co-ordination between these two legal actors. In this sense, if the 
English tradition is moving towards the idea of a co-ordination and not separation 
between the police and prosecutors, the Italian case could provide a good example of 
the advantages and (possibly more important) the limits that this tendency can have. 
As noted, it is not possible to directly compare Italian and English criminal justice. 
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But Italy can be presented as a sort of axis of reference, which may contribute to the 
understanding of co-ordination between the police and prosecutors when judicial 
supervision is founded on the prosecutors’ power to direct the investigation. Finally, it 
is difficult to say if, in general, during the investigation the prosecutors’ role is 
passive and reactive or proactive. Only observations and file analysis of a 
representative sample of cases could provide this information. Pubblici ministeri 
appear passive because they do not, generally, perform investigative acts; but they are 
active when they prompt via directives. Certainly Italian prosecutors appear more 
passive and reactive within the bureaucratic review model of supervision compared to 
the “prompting and reviewing” system. However, the passive/active dichotomisation 
of judicial supervision discourse would be misleading and too narrow. What can be 
argued is that the reality of supervision is variable, and that the very nature of judicial 
supervision in Italy stems from the various decisions that prosecutors can make. This, 
in the end, appears to be the distinctive feature of judicial supervision in Italy. And, as 
noted at the outset, this presents a different way to look at and interpret judicial 
supervision.   
     
 
 
 
 
